



TITLE BY ADVERSE POSSESSION.
TITLE to land by adverse possession is based upon the Statute
of Limitations. While the statute does not profess to take an
estate from one man and give it to another, yet, it bars the claim
of the former owner, and quiets the title of him who has actually
occupied the premises for the period prescribed by the statute. The
effect of the statute is to transfer the title to the adverse occupant.
In Graffius v. Tottenham, 1 W. & S. 488, GIBSON, J., says: "The
title of the original owner is unaffected and untrammelled till the
last moment, and is vested in the adverse occupant by the comple-
tion of the statutory bar." The Statute of Limitations is said by
an eminent jurist (Story's Confl. of Laws, sect. 576) to be one "of
repose to quiet titles, to suppress frauds, and to supply the defi-
ciency of proofs arising from the ambiguity and obscurity or an-
tiquity of transactions." The prescription of the civil law was not
as broad in its application as the Statute of Limitations. It being
provided that "things movable may be prescribed to after the ex-
piration of three years, and that a possession during a long tract of
time, will also found a prescription to things immovable; that is to
say, ten years if the parties are present, and twenty years if either
of them be absent. Property may thus be acquired * * * if the
property was honestly obtained at first :" Sanders's Justinian, Lib.
2, title 6.
By the ancient common law, a person might have prescribed for
a right which had been enjoyed by his ancestors or predecessors at
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any distance of time, even though his or their enjoyment of it had
been suspended for an indefinite series of years. But by the Stat-
ute of Limitations of 32 Henry 8, c. 2, it was enacted, that no
person shall make any prescription by the seisin or possession of
his ancestor or predecessor, unless such seisin or possession hath
been within three-score years next before such prescription made:
,2 Blackstone Com. 264. By the statute 21 James 1, c. 16, the
period within which an action must be brought to recover posses-
sion of real estate was reduced to twenty years.
There can be -but one actual seisin -of an estate; Two persons
cannot be actually seised of the same land at the same time, claim-
ing it by title adverse to each other: 3 Wash. Real Property 125.
At common law seisin was the completion of the feudal investiture,
by which the tenant was admitted into the feud, and performed the
rites of homage and fealty: Stearns's Real Actions 2. Seisin in
deed is said to be actual possession of the freehold, and seizin in
law is a legal right to such possession. A constructive seisin in
deed is said to be equivalent to an actual seisin: Green v. Liter, 8
Cranch 244.
Where two persons are in possession at the same time, under dif-
ferent claims of right, he has the seisin in whom .is the true title:
3 Wash. R. P. 128, and cases cited. To constitute an actual dis-
seisin there must not only be an unlawful entry upon lands, but it
must be made with he intention to dispossess the owner: 4 Kent
Com. 488; Smith v. Bartes, 6 Johns. 218; .Bradstreetv. Hunting-
ton, 5 Peters 439; Nwing v. Barnett, 11 Id. 41. The quo animo
in which the possession was taken, is a test of its adverse charac-
ter, and possession to be adverse must be intended to be in hostility
to the true owner; but the question of intention ordinarily, is one
of fact, to be submitted to the jury : Magee v. Magee,.37 Miss. 149.
In the case of Yetzer v. Toman, 17 Ohio St. 133, it was held that
under the Statute pif Limitations of Ohio, if a party, established in
_himself or in connection with those under whom he claims, an
actual, notorious, continuous and exclusive possession of land for
,a period of twenty-one years, he thereby, except as to persons
under disabilities, acquires a title to the land, irrespective of any
questionw of motive or mistake. Where a party claims by disseisin,
-which has.ripened into a valid title by lapse of time, he must show
.an actual, open, exclusive adverse possession for the length of time
.required by the statute; Hawk v. enseman, 6 S. & R. 21; Cal-
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houn v. ook, 9 Penna. St. 226 ; Melvin v. Prop'rs of Locks et
al., 5 Me. 15 ; Cahill v. Palmer, 45 N. Y. 484; -Robinson v. Luke,
14 Iowa 424; Booth v. Small, 23 Id. 177; Horbaeh-v. Miller, 4
Neb. 47. Actual residence upon or enclosure of the land is not
necessarily requisite to constitute such possession; acts of notoriety,
such as entering upon the land and making improvements thereon,
raising crops, felling trees growing on the land, and taxation of the
land for a series of years to the person claiming it, and the pay-
ment of taxes by him, are competent evidence tending to show ad-
verse possession: .Ellicott v. -Deal, 10 Pet. 412; Ewing v. Barnett,
11 Id. 41; Allen v. Gilmore, 18 le. 178; Little v. Libbey, 2
Greenleaf 242 ; Miller v. Shaw, 7 S. & R. 186 ; Parrer v. .essen-
den, 39 N. H. 277; Horbach v. Miller, 4 Neb. 47. The extent
of the possession must be determined by the character of the entry.
If a party enters under color of title by deed or other written
instrument and occupies and improves a portion of the land, he
acquires actual possession of all the land embraced in his deed or
instrument in writing, and this too although the title conveyed by
the deed or other written instrument may have no validity: .Pres-
cott v. .Yevers, 4 Mason 830; Jackson v. Porter, Paine 457; By-
num v. Thompson, 3 Ired. 578 ; Webb v. Sturtevant, 1 Scam. 187;
KWyle v. Tubbs, 23 Cal. 431; Welborn v. Anderson, 87 Miss. 155.
The Supreme Court of Alabama say: the whole doctrine of adverse
possession rests upon the presumed acquiescence of the owner.
Acquiescence cannot be presumed unless the owner has or may be
presumed to have notice of the possession: BenAJ v. Creagh, 21
Ala. 151; Brown v. Cockerell, 33 Id. 47. But actual notice to the
owner of the land is not necessary; notice will be presumed from
actual occupation of the land.
Merely taking a deed to land is not sufficient to constitute an
adverse possession; it must be followed by an actual entry, and it
is only from the time of such entry that the Statute of Limitations
begins to run: Robinson v. Luke, 14 Iowa 424. If a person is in
possession under color of title, and occupying a portion of the prem,
ises, it has been held that another person .cannot acquire construc-
tive possession by occupying a portion, with color of title to the
whole; his possession will be restricted to the part which he actually
occupies: Jackson v. Vermylyea, 6 Cowen 677. It is held that
where possession is claimed of lands held under a color of title, by
cultivation of a part, such constructive possession cannot be ex-
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tended beyond a single lot of land, or single farm: Jackson v.
Woodruff, 1 Cowen 286. The rule would be different, however,
in case of actual occupancy of a portion of each lot -or farm de-
scribed in the deed. As to what constitutes color of title, the
authorities seem to "hold that if the title under which the party
claims, and under which he entered, shows the character and
extent of his claim, it is sufficient to constitute adverse possession:
Bell v. Longworth, 6 Ind. 273; Doe v. Hearich, 14 Id. 243;
Jackson v. Todd, 2 Caines 183; Jackson v. Sharp, 9 Johns. 162;
12 Id. 365; 16 Id. 293; 18 Id. 40, 365.
But it is not enough that a claimant enters under a void deed
regularly recorded, and causes a survey to be made of the lands
according to the deed, and pays the taxes on the lands for a num-
ber of years, they being wild and uncultivated: Little v. Megquia,
2 Me. 176; Bates v. Norcross, 14 Pick. 224. Where a party enters
upon land without color of title, his right can never extend beyond
the limits actually occupied by him; Barr v. Gatz, 4 Wheat. 213.
To constitute such adverse possession as will bar the right of the
owner of the estate, it is essential that the possession should be
continued for the period prescribed by the statutes. If the con-
tinuity of possession is broken before the expiration of the time
fixed by the statute, an entry within the time will render the prior
possession unavailing: Pederick v. Searle, 2 S. & R. 240; Wick-
liffe v. £nsor, 9 B. Mon. 253 ; Holdfast v. Shepard, 6 Ired. 361 ;
Taylor v. Burnsides, 1 Gratt. 165; .Doev. Eslava, 11 Ala. 102.. But
when one enters upon land claiming title to the same, and con-
tinues to reside thereon, he may convey his interest by deed, and if
the possession of such person and those claiming under him added
together amounts to the time fixed by the Statute of Limitations,
such possession is a bar to a recovery: Overfield v. Christie, 7
S. & R. 177; McCoy v. Dickenson College, 5 Id. 254; Pan-
ing v. WZo., 3 Day 269; MeNeeley v. Langan, 22 Ohio St.
37. No possession can be held to be adverse to one who has no
right of entry during its continuance; therefore the Statute of
Limitations does not run against a reversioner till the death of the
tenant for life, even if the latter has conveyed the estate in fee:
Gernet v. -Lynn, 31 Penn. St. 94; Melvin v. Locks et al., 16
Pick. 137; s. c. 17 Id. 255; Raymond v. Holder, 2 Cush. 269.
And the reversioner may enter at any time within the period pre.
scribed by the statute after the termination of the particular estate,
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notwithstanding there may have been a disseisin of the tenant an4
an adverse possession for more than the statutory period, because
the title of the reversioner did not accrue until the determination
of the estate of the tenant. The reason is plain, the doctrine of
adverse possession being predicated on presumed acquiescence of
the owner of the land, and the owner having parted with the pos-
session to the tenant, was not in a position to enforce- his rights.
But in cases of rights of way and of common, it has been held that
when the tenant suffers a direct and palpable injury to his own
possession, that if the landlord had actual knowledge of the injury
and submits, he will be bound: Daniel v. ANott, 11 East 371. And
it has been held that when a disputed boundary line has been ad-
justed by the agreement of the tenant for life, that such agree-
ment is presumptive evidence to bind the remainder-man: Saun-
ders v. Annesley, 2 Sch. & Lef. 101.
The authorities uniformly hold that a tenant cannot set up his
possession as adverse to his landlord so long as the relation of land-
lord and tenant continues to exist. But he may show that his
landlord's title has terminated, after which he may disclaim the
tenancy and make his possession adverse: _fellis v. Lathrop, 22
Wend. 121; Mattis v. Robinson, 1 Neb. 5. If the tenant pur-
chases a better title than that of his landlord, he must surrender
possession to his lessor before he can avail himself of his new title:
Mattis v. Robinson, supra. As between trustee and cestui que
trust, so long as the trust is a continuing one, and is acknowledged
and acted on by the parties, the statute does not begin to run ; but
when it is disavowed by the party in possession, whether it be the
trustee or cestui que trust, and he distinctly with the knowledge of
the other, disclaims to acknowledge the trust and to hold under it,
then the possession from that time becomes adverse: Newmarket
v. Smart, 4 Am. Law Reg. 400, and cases cited. But until the
trust is disavowed, it continues to subsist, and mere lapse of time,
however great, is no bar: Paschall v. Hinderer, 28 Ohio St. 568.
Questions have arisen where the Statute of Limitations has been
changed from twenty-one to ten years during the time a party was
holding adversely, as to the limitation applicable to the case. It
being competent for the legislature to change statutes prescribing
limitations to actions, the one in force at the time suit is brought is
the one applicable to the cause of action': Bigelow v. Beman, 2
Allen 497; Horbach v. Miller, 4 Neb. 457. The legislature cannot
